

Vulnerability Analysis of Feedback Systems

Nathan Woodbury

Advisor: Dr. Sean Warnick



Information & Decision Algorithms Laboratories

Outline

Introduction

Preliminaries: Systems and Structure

Vulnerability in Open-Loop Systems

Vulnerability in Closed-Loop Systems

Conclusions

- Introduction: Vulnerability
- Mathematical Preliminaries
 - Three System Representations & Their Structures
- Open-Loop Results: Secure Structures (DAGs)
- Closed-Loop Results: Fight Fire with Fire
- Conclusions

Introduction: Vulnerability

Preliminaries: Systems and Structure

Vulnerability in Open-Loop Systems


Vulnerability in Closed-Loop Systems

INTRODUCTION: VULNERABILITY

Attack Models

- ▶ Introduction
- Preliminaries: Systems and Structure
- Vulnerability in Open-Loop Systems
- Vulnerability in Closed-Loop Systems
- Conclusions

- Denial of Service
 - Removal of Link
- Deception
 - Interception and Modification of a Link




Attack Models

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- Vulnerability in Closed-Loop Systems
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- Denial of Service
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Underlying Perspective:
Both models involve a distributed system where an enemy does bad things on a link.



Attack Models

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
- Denial of Service
 - Removal of Link
- Deception
 - Interception and Modification of a Link
- Destabilization Attack
 - Attack a Single Link
 - Destabilize Entire System
 - Link Failure
 - Malicious Attack
- Vulnerability
 - Sensitivity of stability to link perturbations
 - Depends on Structure

Underlying Perspective:
Both models involve a distributed system where an enemy does bad things on a link.

Definition of Vulnerability

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- Define e : (attacker) effort
 - smallest signal attacker can place on a particular link to destabilize system.
- Link Vulnerability: $\frac{1}{e}$
 - More effort to destabilize \rightarrow less vulnerable
 - Less effort to destabilize \rightarrow more vulnerable
- System Vulnerability:
 - Max vulnerability over all links
- System Representation defines notion of “link”



Introduction: Vulnerability

Lesson: Vulnerability is a Property of Links

Preliminaries: Systems and Structure

Vulnerability in Open-Loop Systems

Vulnerability in Closed-Loop Systems

SYSTEMS AND STRUCTURE

What is Structure

Introduction

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- Conclusions

- System structure is represented by a graph
 - Shows flow of information
- One system can be represented by many structures
 - We will discuss two (Transfer Functions and Dynamical Structure Functions)

Transfer Functions


Introduction

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- Input-output behavior
- “Black Box”

$$G = \frac{1}{f(s)} \begin{bmatrix} (s+3)^2 & 2 & -(s+3) \\ -2(s+3) & (s+1)(s+3) & 2 \\ 4 & -2(s+1) & (s+1)(s+3) \end{bmatrix}$$

$$f(s) = s^3 + 7s^2 + 15s + 13.$$



The “design” of the system doesn’t worry about implementation, only its input-output behavior


Dynamical Structure Functions (DSFs)

- Introduction
- ▶ Preliminaries: Systems and Structure
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
- Factorization of the Transfer Function

$$G = (I - Q)^{-1}P$$

$$P = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{s+1} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \frac{1}{s+3} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \frac{1}{s+3} \end{bmatrix}, Q = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & \frac{-1}{s+1} \\ \frac{-2}{s+3} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \frac{-2}{s+1} & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$



An implementation of a system.



Introduction: Vulnerability

Lesson: Vulnerability is a Property of Links

Preliminaries: Systems and Structure

Lesson: Definition of Link Depends on Structure,
which depends on Implementation

Vulnerability in Open-Loop Systems

Vulnerability in Closed-Loop Systems

VULNERABILITY IN OPEN-LOOP SYSTEMS

Open-Loop Problem Formulation

- English: Given a system, design its structure to minimize system vulnerability
 - Fact: Links in P don't matter
- Math: Given a fixed TF G , Choose DSF Q (with $P = (I - Q)G$) such that the system vulnerability is minimized:

$$\min_Q \|(I - Q)^{-1}\|_{1-\infty}$$

$1 - \infty$: Size of matrix element (i, j) with largest norm

Generally, this is a hard problem to solve (non-convex)

Conditions of Vulnerability

Introduction


Preliminaries: Systems and Structure

▶ Vulnerability in Open-Loop Systems


Vulnerability in Closed-Loop Systems

Conclusions

- *Theorem 1: A link is vulnerable if and only if it is part of a cycle.*



Same system
Different Implementation
Different Vulnerabilities



Vulnerable Architecture
 Q has internal feedback
 $P = (I - Q)G$

One Secure Architecture
 $Q = 0$ (No Blue Links)
 $P = (I - Q)G = G$

Introduction: Vulnerability

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Vulnerability in Open-Loop Systems

Lesson: Links in cycles are vulnerable


To remove vulnerability, remove cycles

Vulnerability in Closed-Loop Systems

VULNERABILITY IN CLOSED-LOOP SYSTEMS

Motivation

- Sometimes, feedback is necessary
- Given system G , design second system K so that
 - G and K are connected in feedback
 - The combined system behaves well
- Our Contribution
 - Decide best structure, or implementation, of K to minimize vulnerability




Closed-Loop Problem Formulation

- English: Given two systems in feedback, design the structure of one to minimize the vulnerability of the combined system.
- Math: Given fixed TFs G and K , design structure (P, Q) of K such that the system vulnerability is minimized.

$$\min_Q \left\| \begin{bmatrix} G(I - KG)^{-1} \\ (I - KG)^{-1} \end{bmatrix} (I - Q)^{-1} \right\|_{1-\infty}$$

Result 1: Decoupling of Vulnerability

- *Theorem 2:*
Vulnerabilities on links in one system do not depend on the structure of the other system.
 - Only on other system's "black box" behavior
 - Does depend on its own structure



Result 2: We can Fight Fire with Fire

- We know that cycles create vulnerability
- When feedback is necessary, it is possible to use cycles within systems to reduce the vulnerability of the combined system
- There may be a “universal structure” of Q that uses cycles to minimize vulnerability, independent of G and K .

Examples


- Let $G = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{2}{s-1} & \frac{1}{s-1} \\ \frac{1}{s-1} & \frac{2}{s-1} \end{bmatrix},$

- Let $K = \frac{1}{(s+1)(s+3)} \begin{bmatrix} -3s - 4 & -2s - 1 \\ -2s - 1 & -3s - 4 \end{bmatrix}$

Example 1: Fight Fire with Fire

Empty Q


- $Q = 0, P = K$.
- Max Vulnerability = 2.27



Max Vulnerability = 2.27

A Q with Internal Feedback

- $Q = \frac{1}{s+1} \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 32 \\ 32 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$
- $P = \frac{1}{f(s)} \begin{bmatrix} -3s^2 + 57s + 28 & -2s^2 + 93s + 127 \\ -2s^2 + 93s + 127 & -3s^2 + 57s + 28 \end{bmatrix}$,
 $f(s) = (s+1)^2(s+3)$




Max Vulnerability = 1.85



Example 2: A Word of Caution

Empty Q


- $Q = 0, P = K$.
- Max Vulnerability = 2.27



Max Vulnerability = 2.27

A Q with Internal Feedback

- $Q = \frac{1}{s+2} \begin{bmatrix} 0 & -1 \\ -1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$
- $P = \frac{1}{s+2} \begin{bmatrix} -3 & -2 \\ -2 & -3 \end{bmatrix}$



Max Vulnerability = 2.70

Introduction: Vulnerability

Lesson: Vulnerability is a Property of Links

Preliminaries: Systems and Structure

Lesson: Definition of Link Depends on Structure,
which depends on Implementation

Vulnerability in Open-Loop Systems

Lesson: Links in cycles are vulnerable

To remove vulnerability, remove cycles

Vulnerability in Closed-Loop Systems

Lesson: Can use cycles to minimize vulnerability
caused by feedback

CONCLUSIONS

Next Steps

- Is there a universal structure?
- If there is a universal structure, is it the high-gain heuristic?
- If not, how do we design Q to minimize vulnerability?
- What other characteristics of systems should we explore (maintainability, adaptability, cost)?

Acknowledgements

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▶ Conclusions

- Dr. Sean Warnick
- Vasu Chetty
- Phil Paré

QUESTIONS?

APPENDICES

Derivation of a DSF

- Consider a state-space LTI system

$$\begin{bmatrix} \dot{z}_1 \\ \dot{z}_2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \bar{A}_{11} & \bar{A}_{12} \\ \bar{A}_{21} & \bar{A}_{22} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} z_1 \\ z_2 \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \bar{B}_1 \\ \bar{B}_2 \end{bmatrix} u$$

$$y = [\bar{C}_1 \quad \bar{C}_2] \begin{bmatrix} z_1 \\ z_2 \end{bmatrix},$$

where $[\bar{C}_1 \quad \bar{C}_2]$ has full row rank.

- The system can be transformed to

$$\begin{bmatrix} \dot{y} \\ \dot{x} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} A_{11} & A_{12} \\ A_{21} & A_{22} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} y \\ x \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} B_1 \\ B_2 \end{bmatrix} u$$

$$y = [I \quad 0] \begin{bmatrix} y \\ x \end{bmatrix},$$

where y are the states that are measured.

- Taking the Laplace transform, we get

$$\begin{bmatrix} sY \\ sX \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} A_{11} & A_{12} \\ A_{21} & A_{22} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} Y \\ X \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} B_1 \\ B_2 \end{bmatrix} U$$

- Solving for X we get

$$X = (sI - A_{22})^{-1} A_{21} Y + (sI - A_{22})^{-1} B_2 U,$$

which yields

$$sY = WY + VU$$

$$W = A_{11} + A_{12}(sI - A_{22})^{-1} A_{21}$$

$$V = A_{12}(sI - A_{22})^{-1} B_2 + B_1.$$

- Let D be a diagonal matrix with the diagonal entries of W . Then

$$(sI - D)Y = (W - D)Y + VU.$$

Therefore,

$$Y = QY + PU$$

where

$$Q = (sI - D)^{-1}(W - D)$$

$$P = (sI - D)^{-1}V$$

- It can be checked that

$$G = (I - Q)^{-1}P = C(sI - A)^{-1}B.$$

Proof of Theorem 2

- The inverse of H is defined such that $\begin{bmatrix} I - \tilde{Q} & -\tilde{P} \\ -P & I - Q \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} A & B \\ C & D \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} I & 0 \\ 0 & I \end{bmatrix}$.
 - $(I - \tilde{Q})B - PD = 0$, therefore $B = (I - \tilde{Q})^{-1}PD = GD$
 - $(I - Q)C - PA = 0$, therefore $C = (I - Q)^{-1}PA = KA$
 - $(I - \tilde{Q})A - \tilde{P}C = (I - \tilde{Q})A - \tilde{P}KA = I$, therefore $A = (I - \tilde{Q} - \tilde{P}K)^{-1}$
 - $(I - Q)D - PB = (I - Q)D - PGD = I$, therefore $D = (I - Q - PG)^{-1}$
 - Thus $(I - Q)^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} (I - \tilde{Q} - \tilde{P}K)^{-1} & G(I - Q - PG)^{-1} \\ K(I - \tilde{Q} - \tilde{P}K)^{-1} & (I - Q - PG)^{-1} \end{bmatrix}$
- Note that all links in the controller are represented in the bottom rows of \hat{Q} . Since the vulnerability any link (i, j) in the combined system are defined by the h_∞ norm of entry (j, i) in $H = (I - \hat{Q})^{-1}$, the vulnerability of the links in the controller are contained entirely in the equations in the right column of H given above and are expressed only in terms of P , Q , and G .
- Therefore, the vulnerability of the links in the controller are independent of the structure (\tilde{P}, \tilde{Q}) of the links in the plant.
- Note that similarly, the vulnerability of the links in the plant are independent of the structure (P, Q) of the links in the controller.

Vulnerability of Links in a DSF

- Given a DSF (P, Q) and $H = (I - Q)^{-1}$, the vulnerability of a link (i, j) in Q is

$$v(q_{ij}) = \|h_{ji}\|_{\infty}$$

- The vulnerability of the system is

$$V = \max_{(i,j) \in Q} (v(q_{ij}))$$

The One-Infinity Norm

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
Conclusions

- The problem formulation of both open-loop and closed-loop systems involve

$$\min_Q \|X\|_{1-\infty},$$

where X is a matrix of rational functions of form $\frac{p(s)}{q(s)}$.

- The infinity norm computes the maximum gain seen by each entry of X (see figure to the right)
 - Corresponds to the size minimum signal required to destabilize the system.
- The one norm chooses the largest of the computed infinity norms.
- Therefore the one-infinity norm computes the vulnerability of the system, which we wish to minimize by choosing a good Q .



The High-Gain Heuristic (Universal Structure)

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► Vulnerability in Closed-Loop Systems

Conclusions

- We don't yet know how to choose Q to minimize the vulnerability of the combined system.
 - But we have a good idea

- Let

$$Q = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & \frac{n}{p(s)} & \dots & \frac{n}{p(s)} \\ \frac{n}{p(s)} & 0 & & \frac{n}{p(s)} \\ & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \frac{n}{p(s)} & \frac{n}{p(s)} & \dots & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

- In all of our tests, when $n \in \mathbb{R}$ grows large:
 - The vulnerabilities on the links in P approach 0
 - The vulnerabilities on the links in Q approach $\frac{1}{\text{rows}(Q)}$



Example 3: High Gain Heuristic

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- $$Q = \frac{1}{s+1} \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 10000 \\ 10000 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$P = \frac{1}{f(s)} \begin{bmatrix} g(s) & h(s) \\ h(s) & g(s) \end{bmatrix}$$

$$f(s) = (s+1)^2(s+3)$$

$$g(s) = -3s^2 + 19993s + 9996$$


$$h(s) = -2s^2 + 29997s + 39999$$
- $$\tilde{Q} = \frac{1}{s-1} \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 10000 \\ 10000 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\tilde{P} = \frac{1}{f(s)} \begin{bmatrix} g(s) & h(s) \\ h(s) & g(s) \end{bmatrix}$$

$$f(s) = (s+1)^2(s+3)$$

$$g(s) = 2s^2 - 10000s + 9998$$

$$h(s) = s^2 - 20002s + 19999$$



References

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Vulnerability in Closed-Loop Systems

Conclusions

- A. Rai, D. Ward, S. Roy and S. Warnick, "Vulnerable Links and Secure Architectures in the Stabilization of Networks of Controlled Dynamical Systems," *American Control Conference*, Montreal, Canada, accepted for publication, 2012.
- A. Rai, "Analysis and Design Tools for Structured Feedback Systems," M.S. Thesis, Brigham Young Univ., Provo, UT, 2012.